Causality is omnipresent in scientists' verbalisations of their understanding, even though we have no formal consensual scientific definition for it. In Automata Networks, it suffices to say that automata "influence" one another to introduce a notion of causality.
General transition graphs
The general transition graph of a BAN is the graph T g " pB n , Ñq where the relation Ñ is given by: px, yq PÑ ðñ @i P V, x i ‰ y i : i P U pxq.
General transition graphs are simply state transition systems. They were introduced in [4] to to study the behavioural possibilities of networks as opposed to the dynamics.
Block-sequential update schedules
A block-sequential update schedule (BSUS) is an update schedule that updates automata of a network in a certain deterministic periodic order and with a certain amount of synchronism in the updates (possibly none). Within a period of updates, all automata are updated exactly once.
Formally it can be defined as a function ν : A Ñ t´1,`1u such that starting in x P B n at the beginning of the period, @pi, jq P A, νpi, jq "´1 iff i is updated strictly before j is.
Thus, when j is updated, i is already in state f i pxq. Otherwise, if νpi, jq "`1, then i is updated no sooner than j is so when j is updated, i is still in state x i .
The "degree of synchronism" of ν might be formally matched to the number of arcs pi, jq P A such that νpi, jq "`1. This is only a suggestion however because the definition of BSUS given here is not common.
Traditionally, BSUSs are rather defined as lists of disjoint blocks of automata pB k q kďK where Ţ kďK B k " V . Automata in a block are updated in parallel. The blocks are updated sequentially [5, 6] . With this definition, a BSUS has more synchronism if it has less and larger blocks. For example consider the BAN of Fig.1 . It is what we call a Boolean Automata Cycle (BAC). One particular BSUS of this BAC is the following which defines K " n blocks of size 1: tnu, tn´1u, . . . , t3u, t2u, t1u. This BSUS sequentially updates automata in the reverse order of the cycle. It has no synchronism. Another BSUS of the BAC is: t6, . . . , n´1, nu, t2, 3, . . . , 5u, t1u which defines K " 3 blocks.
Two of them are of size greater than 1 so this BSUS does have some synchronism.
It updates at once all automata in block B 1 " t6, . . . , n´1, nu. Then it updates at once all automata in block B 2 " t2, 3, . . . , 5u. And only then does it update automaton 1.
The BSUS t2, 3, . . . , n´1, nu, t1u has even more synchronism since it updates at once all automata except automaton 1, before it updates automaton 1.
Notably, all three of these BSUSs are equivalent to ν : A Ñ t´1,`1u defined by νpi, jq " 1 ô pi, jq ‰ pn, 1q.3 
Synchronism vs Precedence
In some circumstances, a synchronous updating of automata seems to cause local instabilities to linger in the network longer than they might with more sequentiality.
In other terms, synchronism seems to inhibit the decrease of the number |U pxq| of automata that are unstable. And as a consequence, it also seems to be responsible for the global asymptotic instability of the BAN [1, [2] [3] [4] .
Indeed, on the one hand, the BSUSs of BACs that allow for the most local and global instability are the BSUSs with a less synchronism [1, 2] . Moreover, we know that with the parallel update schedule a BAC has many attractors. And the majority of those attractors involve several local instabilities circulating through the network [7] . On the other hand, in the asynchronous setting, all BAC trajectories lead to an attractor that has either 0 or 1 instabilities [8] . And the general transition graphs of BACs show that at least some sequentiality is required at some point to reduce the number of instabilities in the BAC.
All this supports the idea that synchronism is responsible for entertaining instabilities.
In communities focusing on asynchronous Automata Networks to model genetic regulation networks, synchronism is actually notorious for this effect. Synchronism's alleged tendency to artificially entertain instabilities in a network is a very common informal argument invoked to undermine the realism of updating schedules involving synchronism, and the relevance of research that doesn't rule synchronism out altogether. As I was cutting my teeth on such research [2, 3, 7, [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] , it was necessary for me to investigate the causal link between synchronism and instability [15] .
As it turns out, when a small amount of synchronism is added to an otherwise asynchronous BAN, synchronism either has no lasting effect (most frequent case by far), or it has some (this is the case with the BAN of Fig.2 ). And if it has some then, precisely, its effect is to stabilise all local instabilities. And in that, it stabilises the whole BAN [15] (see Fig.3 ).`3
This is the BAN given in [15] as an example of "synchronism-sensitive" BAN. Its asynchronous transition graph T a is represented and discussed in Fig.3 together with the addition of some synchronism to T a .
So on the one hand, synchronism seems to cause instabilities to linger, on the other it 'causes' instabilities to disappear. The quotes around 'causes' are to help keep in mind that the notion of causality we are manipulating here is not one that is formally defined. In both situations, synchronism is seen as a cause of something, but in none is it actually the logical implicant of anything. Causality, which is not logical implication, is much more charged with meaning than logical implication is. Here, it is charged in particular with the specific meaning of the term "synchronism" that is used in each of the two situations (cf. paragraph on Block sequential update schedules on Page 3).
The conclusion we can draw from the apparent contradiction is the following.
We have taken a certain perspective. According to this perspective, 'synchronism' is a ÝÑ 0000 is added, the BAN looses its second attractor. The thing to notice is the following. Consider the state x " 1100. In this state, if the two instabilities -that of automaton 0 P U pxq and that of automaton 1 P U pxq -are not settled -i.e. if the synchronous transition is not made -then either the two parts of what constitutes a XOR x 0 ' x 1 , namely px 0^ x 1 q and p x 0^x1 q start being schlepped around in the network, from one automaton to the next, thereby entertaining a certain tacit dependency between the instabilities of automata, precisely the dependencies that characterises the second attractor of the asynchronous updating. It isn't yet clear however whether or not they assemble straightforwardly into x 0 ' x 1 at some point. But the BAN of Fig.2 being a minimal example of synchronism-sensitive BAN [15] , this suggests there is a relation between synchronism-sensitivity and non-monotony. meaningful notion: it is a notion that pinpoints actual causes of notable effects we are interested in. More specifically, according to this perspective, 'synchronism' is the type of thing that can cause an effect on local instabilities. With this perspective, we run into an apparent contradiction. Two opposite effects are incumbent on the same cause.
And that in itself is a call for an update of perspective. Synchronism (and asynchronism for that matter) might not be the appropriate notion to explain either of the effects we want it to explain in relation to instabilities.
Nonetheless, the intuitions expressed by the two different cause/effect relations involving synchronism and instabilities cannot be baseless. Or at least this much is true: considering that they are baseless is not going to help us make any progress, we had better trust that they aren't and go looking for their basis in order to formalise it.
Ruling out synchronism as a possible medium for the effects of entertaining and settling instabilities means that we need a new candidate cause that can convey a finer form of causality accounting coherently for both effects. Comparing the two contradictory situations reveals that precedence might be a more reasonable choice for that. Just like synchronism, it is involved in both situations. And it is a plausible basis for both sides of the contradiction as it can explain both situations coherently. Indeed, in the first situation, instead of "Synchronism causes instabilities to linger" or rather instead The effects studied in [15] were classified in terms of varying degrees of sensitivity to synchronism. But following this discussion, sensitivity to precedence of causally related events might be a more accurate and relevant way of coining the same effects.
Generally, if pi, jq P A and i P U pxq, j R U pxq, then updating i before j -assuming j owes its stability in x to i being in state x i -causes i to stabilise and j to become unstable in turn. If both automata i P U pxq, j P U pxq are unstable in x, then -assuming x i is the reason for j's instability in x -updating i before j will stabilise i in state x i and thereby also cause the stabilisation of j in state x j " f j px i q.
It no longer is a matter of synchronism. Periodicity -perhaps even more subtly: the specific kind of redundancy inherent to periodicity -is another notable difference between the two situations. In the lead of F.
Robert [5] , a great many studies have been supporting the general idea that "update schedules have great influence on the dynamics of BANs" [16-18, 2, 3, 14, 19] . But just like precedence and determinism, until periodicity's own effects aren't studied per se, there is no rigorous way to form a more reliable intuitive understanding of what generally causes the entertainment of local instabilities under BSUSs and of what, other than asynchronism, tends to prevent the entertainment of local instabilities when synchronism is not exploited.
Interlude
The previous section discussed a case where two different effects are intuitively 
Oscillations and the difference between experience of change and communication of change
In some contexts, negative feedback loops, or negative cycles (cf. Fig.1 ) are considered to be directly responsible for the asymptotic oscillations of BANs [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . In different contexts, BANs can have asymptotic oscillations without negative cycles [16, 25, 7, 26] .
Asymptotic oscillations can therefore not intuitively be attributed to negative cycles (nor to the specific context of each case for that matter). Negative cycles are not the fundamental generating mechanism of asymptotic oscillations. A close comparison between those apparently contradictory cases reveals however, that with or without negative cycles, asymptotic oscillations are essentially generated the same way:
"something" is disallowing the collapse of an offset between the actual state of a certain automaton i and the pending influence it sends out to itself possibly via other automata.
In the first context, that "something" is a negative feedback loop. In the other contexts, it is a combination of a positive feedback loop, some in situ potentiality (defined by 
Interlude
The way Sections 2 and 4 suggest to make use of the notion of causality is by considering it as essentially progressive so that we let causal relations point towards the signs that already exist of their own coming obsolescence. A particular advantage of taking such a flexible, yet deliberate and rigorous perspective on causality is that it keeps us aware of the possibility of having different causes causing the same effects and thus that the explanations we currently have of the effects we currently are interested in might still be worth investigating even if they appear to be perfectly functional and complete explanations. This perspective on causality also prepares us to deal with new situations in which we observe the same familiar effects in a system, without having any formal reason to believe that the same implicants we are used to are responsible. And it favours keeping in mind the possibility that causes we have represented of the effects we have observed, can themselves be abstractions of more subtle, atomic mechanisms operating at a lower level of abstraction. It encourages finding ways to exploit this possibility in order to refine our explanations and understanding. Generally, this approach to causality emphasises the fact that for a significant part, what we manipulate as scientists is representations of the objects that we study, not just the objects themselves. And in emphasising this fact, it allows us to take advantage of it. Now of course, BANs can be studied with purely mathematical interests and perspectives. Then, causality is not such an important concern. Implication is enough. But because it applies only to specific properties of specific systems in specific conditions, implication has the downside of being much less portable than causality. Moreover, in theory, we are free to pick any restriction on the kinds of BANs we consider. And often, when BANs are studied for purely mathematical reasons, the priority is to pick a restriction that will help derive new mathematical results . . .
Non-monotony and efficiency
A common restriction motivated by biological considerations is the restriction to monotone (B)ANs [8, 21, [27] [28] [29] . Fig.4 shows that a monotone BAN can behave just like a non-monotone BAN in some conditions (see also [30] As illustrated in Fig.4 , for a monotone BAN's behaviour to look just like that of a nonmonotone BAN, it requires the right arrangement in time of automata updates, and it requires us ignoring certain intermediary steps. For the monotone BAN on the right of Fig.4 to behave like the non-monotone BAN on the left, automaton 4 needs to be updated systematically before automaton 1 is, and the two sequential transitions x " LEFT and RIGHT, the function defining how automaton i behaves is f i pxq " x j ' x for P tj, ku. Whether or not j is considered to be an influencer of i depends on whether " j or ‰ k. And yet, the non-monotone BAN on the right can be made to behave exactly as the monotone BAN on the left by imposing the systematic precedence of the update of k over that of i so that @x, f i pxq "
Of course, such a claim needs to find some formal support. Even though the notion of causality it conveys is unlikely to be exhausted in one proven mathematical statement, the claim might nonetheless be supported to some extent by putting forward proven mathematical statements that are compatible with it just like the example of Fig.4 is.
But Fig.5 suggests that just like with synchronism, at some point, we might need to call into question non-monotony's capacity at explaining relevantly the effects we attribute the responsibility of to it. And together with that, we'll have to call into question the perspective that places the focus on the distinction monotony/non-monotony rather than on a more subtle distinction, one that can provide more complete explanations with less means. In other terms, non-monotony will eventually have to give way to a finer explanation of the same effects. And considering Fig.5 , it seems that two notions implied by non-monotony might then be put forward instead of non-monotony: a notion of "witness" and a notion of "inconsistent parallel transfer of the same information".
Non-expansivity
In some (asynchronous) contexts [20, 31] , a BAN N is defined using the global update function F : x Þ Ñ pf 1 pxq, . . . , f n pxqq " N which happens to coincide with the function defining the dynamics of N under a parallel update schedule. The definition is equivalent to the one chosen in Section 1, namely N " tf 1 , . . . , f n u. But it makes it more natural to pick restrictions on BANs that are given by properties of F . An example is non-expansivity: @x, y P B n : |tx i ‰ y i u| ě |tF pxq i ‰ F pyq i u|. Intuitively, F 's non-expansivity corresponds to the BAN having a form of global instantaneous potential. Assuming F 's non-expansivity happens to favour the derivation of some results about asynchronous BANs [32, 33] . But precisely, asynchronous BANs are BANs whose dynamical constraints forbid them the use of this global potential. This makes it difficult to grasp intuitively the meaning of the results in question. And mathematical results that are more difficult to have an intuitive grasp on are often results that are more difficult to generalise and relate to other results.
Assumptions and intuitions
The examples of sections 6 and 7 show that however mathematically sound are the mathematical results we prove thanks to mathematical assumptions/restrictions, disregard for intuitive causality at worst stakes the applicability of those results, and generally limits our progression. In particular, without deliberate care, there is no reason to believe that we owe the deriving of these results to some deeper opportune relevance of the mathematical assumptions/restrictions. There is no reason to believe there is anything in the assumptions/restrictions that could enable the generalisation of the results beyond the setting they define, nor anything that could at least guarantee the relatability of the results to other existing results. The primary reason why we might have managed to derive anything under a particular assumption/restriction might be that it is an extremely strong assumption/restriction. It might be like studying crows by concentrating on the class of crows that a human being has reported seeing picking up a piece of pink plastic wrapper. It might be quite unclear what it is that we are studying and learning about exactly: the original (mathematical) object of interest? the restriction? And in the case of Automata Networks, this means that the only hope to actually build a global understanding of networks lies in the platonic wager that it will necessarily "emerge" from the accumulation of independent studies made of particular models of networks in different settings, sometimes juxtaposed for comparison. In lines with Section 2, let us mention as an example that a great amount of rigorous theoretical attention has been invested in the study of a large variety of update schedules [5, 6, 16-18, 34-39, 2, 3, 14, 19] . And yet, none of the studies it occasioned, not even the ones that compare specific update schedules, have yet provided explicit answers to the kind of fundamental questions mentioned in Section 3, including questions about the effect per se of the redundancy inherent to the periodicity of a periodic update contributes to the way we attribute properties to a system. Yet, it isn't always clearly distinguished from causality.
Generally, when it isn't regarded as a pre-existing constraint on the systems we consider, time flow -or rather just "Time" -is seen as a "resource", suggesting that we have a tacit obligation to use it sparingly, and, without fail, in finite quantity. Whatever we call it, we tend to assume that it pre-exists both the systems we study and the attention we invest in them, and that it frames both the systems' behavioural possibilities and the leeway we take on them. Operational Research works its satisfaction and optimisation problems around it; Bio-informatics builds models out of what it knows of it or despite what it doesn't [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] ; and even for Concurrency, time flow is mostly something in which distributed pieces of computation might be reunited [45, 46] . Despite its very dense presence in the scientific landscape, time flow is seldom a primary object of our attention. This results in plenty space for spontaneous interpretations to operate. And in particular it gives carte blanche to a natural tendency we have to expediently distinguish, confuse, overlook or classify issues and properties related to time flow such as simultaneity, synchronicity, precedence, subsequence, difference, determinism, periodicity, causality, time scale, change, process of change, realism, duration. As a result, we miss out on (a) the vicariance of some of these properties for which time flow might actually not be the exclusive medium, and (b) possible leeway through this vicariance.
In an isolated network, time flow is precisely determined by the set of all possible events considered in the network and by their relative order 1 .
Giving to causality the attention advocated for in the previous sections leads to putting emphasis on the notion of time flow. It requires to systematically isolate the involvement time flow has in the effects we take interest in, and decompose it into more atomic properties that can more tightly be held responsible for the effects. Thus, the effects of specific properties of time flow (possibly implicitly assumed by the specific framework, e.g. precedence of certain event occurrences over certain others) may be compared with effects of properties specific to networks (properties of the f i s). And thus, we can work towards a better understanding of network sensitivity to time flow. We can start clarifying the kind of information time flow is a vehicle of, as well as the part of the information encoded in the clockworks of networks (the f i 's) that can equivalently be encoded into time flow.
Eventually we may also clarify the kind of computation complexity time flow can manage.
Indeed, results [15] suggest that under very specific conditions, attributes of time flow might participate in the overall network computation in ways that are comparable to logical gates.
As argued in [30] , the notion of synchronism in BANs is often confused with a notion of simultaneity in 'reality' referring to dates represented by the same point on
The Time-Line [30] . Nonetheless, in BANs, the possibility of synchronism is an atemporal relation between possible events. It relates events of the set tx i x i | i P U pxqu. or else, we did a bad job in modelling the real system and/or in choosing a formalism to do that. Building a model with the capacity of revealing causal relationships that are otherwise not apparent to us, is not the same thing as building a representation of the set of effects we are interested in. The relative ordering of the occurrences of synchronously possible events creates new relationships between those eventsrelationships that otherwise don't exist as evidenced by the synchronous possibility of these events. Thus, it brings together otherwise presently independent pieces of information and can cause them to interact as they wouldn't have if they had been left independent. In the case of the BAN of Fig.2 , the effect of adding this relation evokes that of logical connectors (^, _, ', cf. caption of Fig.3 ). Of course, again, this claim begs to be investigated.
Conclusion
There is not much reason to believe that there is a scientific definition of the notion of causality that can be found to account completely for the way causality serves science-making. Centuries of modern science-making haven't been enough to find anything close to a satisfying proposition. The notion is much too large and diverse to be fitted exhaustively into a fixed predefined formalisation of it. Besides, causality stands for humans' instinctive way of grasping the world. It is an essential part of our motivation to explore the world further and have more of it grasped. It makes sense to have it serve science-making in an unformalised intuitive way. This is however not a reason for letting it serve science-making in a fortuitous way. And we have shown that rather than sidelining the manifestations of this intuitive instinct of ours, we can advantageously supervise its interference with the scientific formalism we use, and let it serve as a pointer towards knowledge in need of further explicit formalisation.
